Philosophy of Science

This course aims to provide an introduction to some of the current discussions and debates in philosophy of science. We will examine the recent history of philosophical perspectives on scientific inquiry, beginning with the logical positivism, a view that attempts to employ logical methods to justify scientific inquiry. We also will discuss the historicist movement stemming from Kuhn as well as the interpretative tradition (from Gadamer over Jürgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor to Clefford Geertz). In a second and third unit we will discuss systematic topics in the field of philosophy of science such as explanation, causation, and laws.

Students are expected to do the assigned reading and to attend all three class sessions. Prior to each class session each student should submit a one-paragraph comment or question to three of the readings. These may either seek clarification about or raise objections to major points in the reading. The contributions should reflect an effort to understand the assigned material and should provide the context for the issue raised. In a final paper (this should be in the range of 1,200 to 1,800 words and will be based largely on the material we are covering in class) students will create their own philosophical arguments to provide a clear and consistent defense of their views on a main topic in the field of philosophy of science. Students will receive 1.5 ECTS.

Session I: Traditions in the philosophy of science (Logical Positivism, Interpretative Tradition, etc.)
Readings
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003). Logic Plus Empiricism. In: Godfrey-Smith (Ed.), Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19-56.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1960). Hermeneutical Understanding. From Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method, New York: The Crossroad Corporation, Second Revised Edition, pp. 300-307.
Habermas, J. (1973). The hermeneutic claim to universality. In: Josef Bleicher: Hermeneutics, as Method, Philosophy and Critique, London: Routledge, pp. 181-211.
Ricoeur, P. (1973). Towards a critical hermeneutic: hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. From: P. Ricoeur: Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 63-64; 90-100.
Taylor, Ch. (1971). Interpretation and the sciences of man. Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 25 (1), 3-10.
Geertz, C. (1973). The thick description of culture. From: Thick description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture. In: Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, 1973, pp. 5, 10-13.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Kuhn and Normal Science. In: Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, pp. 75-86.

Session II: ‘When should a theory be ranked as scientific?’
Readings
Popper, K. (1962). Science: Conjectures and refutations. In K. Popper, Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, pp. 33-65.
Hollis, M. (1994). Ants, Spiders, and Bees. In: M. Hollis: The Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 66-93).
Hempel, C. G. (1966). Scientific Inquiry: Invention and Test. In: Hempel: Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp. 3-18.

Session III: Scientific Explanation
Readings
Carl G. Hempel: Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation. From “Explanation in Science and History,” in: R.G. Colodny (1962). Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, London & Pittsburgh: Allen and Unwin and University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 9-19, 32.
Kaplan, A. (2004). Explanation. In: A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry. Methodology for Behavioral Science. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 327-369.
Klahr & Simon (1999). Studies of Scientific Discovery: Complementary Approaches and Convergent Findings. Psychological Bulletin, 125 (5), 524-543.