Aristotelian universals, strong immanence, and construction
Additional information
Authors
Costa D.,
Giordani A.
Type
Journal Article
Year
2024
Language
English
Abstract
The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven, promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground.
Journal
Synthese
Volume
203
Number ( Month )
2
Pages (or article number)
35
ISSN
1573-0964
Diffusion
License
License undefined
Visibility
Private