Nepotism in IPOs: Consequences for Issuers and Investors
Informazioni aggiuntive
Autori
Degeorge F.,
Pratobevera G.
Tipo
Articolo pubblicato in rivista scientifica
Anno
2025
Lingua
Inglese
Sommario
IPO underwriters have an incentive to underprice an IPO when they allocate shares to their affiliated funds. We label this conflict of interest “supernepotism” and we analyze its effect on IPO pricing. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) on a novel hand-collected data set, we find that higher allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds cause higher IPO underpricing. Our evidence suggests that supernepotism has monetary costs for issuers.
Parole chiave
Underpricing, IPOs, Affiliated funds, Conflicts of interest, RDD
Periodico
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume
60
Numero ( Mese )
5 ( August )
Pagine (o numero dell’articolo)
2367-2397
