Purpose: An analysis of Plato’s dialogue Sophist
In antiquity as well as in modern times, many philosophers have wondered about the concept of not-being. For instance, many philosophers have maintained that the idea of a creation ex nihilo is absurd. But it is in the area of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind that the problem of not-being becomes really troublesome: how is it possible to speak of what is not or to think of it? If speaking of what is not is to speak falsely, and to think of what is not is to make a false judgement, one might even feel compelled to aver the completely counter-intuitive claim that it is impossible to speak falsely and to make a false judgement. This course will address the solution to this problem offered in Plato’s Sophist. This dialogue will be analysed in its details and its most important passages will be carefully commented on.
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