Open lobbying. A political theory approach to lobbying regulation

Open lobbying. A political theory approach to lobbying regulationLobbying is a crucial component of democracy. While especially in the last decade political science and law research produced a large literature on the influence of interest groups on policy processes and on regulatory measures concerning lobbying, a political theory of lobbying and lobbying regulation is still missing. Such a theory needs to tackle not only the philosophical issues of the legitimacy of political interests and of the opposition between Public Interest and particular interests, but should also encompass the most recent reflections on the design of participatory and deliberative democracy, and on collective intelligence in the age of digital innovation.The main aim of my research visit at Yale University is to develop and refine such a theory, through the perspective and the methods of political theory (conceptual analysis and critical discussion).In fact, while the overall objective is to have the possibility to interact and to collaborate with Prof. Hélène Landemore and other top scholars at Yale University, the more specific aim is to refine an “open lobbying” theory, finalizing its form in a published paper. The impact of such a theory can be crucial to assess actual regulatory frameworks and to develop more solid approaches to lobbying regulation itself.An additional aim is the establishment of a research network (between Prof. Landemore and myself, but not only), able to set the ground for further scientific collaborations and initiatives between Università della Svizzera italiana and Yale University.